This paper is devoted to the analysis of all constitutions equipped with electoral systems involving two step procedures. First, one candidate is elected in every jurisdiction by the electors in that jurisdiction, according to some aggregation procedure. Second, another aggregation procedure collects the names of the jurisdictional winners in order to designate the final winner. It appears that whenever individuals are allowed to change jurisdiction when casting their ballot, they are able to manipulate the result of the election except in very few cases. When imposing a paretian condition on every jurisdiction's voting rule, it is shown that, in the case of any finite number of candidates, any two steps voting rule that is not manipulable by movement of the electors necessarily gives to every voter the power of overruling the unanimity on its own. A characterization of the set of these rules is next provided in the case of two candidates. JEL classification number: D71, D72
Introduction
In this paper we are interested in all constitutions with electoral systems such that the winner of the election is designated in a two step procedure, like for instance GreatBritain, Canada or the US electoral systems. In these constitutions, the country is divided into jurisdictions in which elections are held at the first step as to choose the jurisdictional winners. In the second step, the government is appointed by an aggregation procedure over all the jurisdictional winners. The question that is under scrutiny is that of the stability and the manipulability by movement of the voters of constitutions with such two step electoral procedures.
The issue of manipulability by movement of such systems has currently been at stake, as suggest the following recent examples. During the 2005 campaign in Great-Britain for the election of the Members of Parliament (MPs), various websites and forums have been created invoking tactical vote (votedorset.net, helpbeathoward.org.uk, tacticalvoter.net, ditchdavis.com...). On votedorset.net, we could find the following advertisement before the election "Four Lib Dems are seeking suitable Labour pairs, and our target is Oliver Letwin's seat (a Conservative MP). We would like to swap all four of our tactical votes for Labour in Burton (East Staffordshire) with four equivalent tactical votes for the Lib Dems in Dorset West."
For electoral purposes Britain is divided into constituencies, each of which returns one MP to the House of Commons. The British electoral system is based on the relative majority method -usually referred to as the plurality rule, sometimes also called the "first past the post" principle -which means the candidate with more votes than any other is elected. The leader of the political party which wins most seats (although not necessarily most votes) at a general election, or who has the support of a majority of members in the House of Commons, is by convention invited by the Sovereign to form the new government. The purpose of the websites about tactical vote is to change what would be the result of the election if everyone voted in his constituency. They thus offer to match people located in different constituencies and willing to exchange their votes in order to beat their commonly less desired candidate, the Conservative in this case. However, these voters give up their first choice, hoping that their pair will do the same in their constituency. Consequently, although the overall number of votes granted to every party is the same, the result of the final election might be reversed by such a manipulation.
Such an idea was earlier implemented by the ecologist party's supporters backing Ralph Nader, a candidate running in the 2000 election in the US. There again, voters connected to the net (see, among others, www.voteswap.com) could decide to vote for Gore instead of Nader in states where the election was tight between Gore and Bush, while all paired voters would vote for Nader in states where Gore had a large victory planned. Although Gore won the popular vote by more than 540.000 votes, Bush was elected after his victory in Florida, which happened to be the swing state, by 537 votes only. There is no doubt that such a manipulation could have been very efficiently implemented, in order to reverse the result of that presidential election. For more on vote trading implementing through internet sites, see the recent paper by Hartvigsen (2006) . From a logical standpoint, such a manipulation is in fact logically equivalent to allowing voters to change the constituency they are voting in. Indeed, two voters swapping votes amounts to voters swapping residency. We thus suggest that electoral procedures involving two steps are in general subject to such manipulability by movement of the electors.
In what follows, stability refers to the fact that, in such constitutions, the result of the two step election should be the same, whatever the location of the individuals when they cast their ballot. Conversely, an unstable constitution would be such that for two different partitions of the set of individuals into jurisdictions, the election could yield two different outcomes. Stability, such as defined here, does not refer to any change in the electors' vote profile, rather it is only concerned with their location. In turn, a constitution such that some electors can not only change the result of the election by changing jurisdiction but can change it in their favour, will be said to be manipulable. Manipulability by movement, such as considered in this paper, is different from the standard notion of manipulationà la Gibbard-Satterthwaite (1973 , 1975 . Indeed, in our analysis we assume that individuals are allowed to change jurisdiction, but when doing so, they do not change their vote. Contrary to the Gibbard-Satterthwaite result, we are not concerned by the fact electors vote for their best alternative or not, nevertheless we assume they behave identically, whatever the jurisdiction they vote in.
Issues about such manipulations, that do not involve vote swapping, are raised within the European community. Considering the lot of nomadic populations, whose civic rights are rarely guaranteed, two European deputies, Alima Boumedienne-Thiery and Olivier Duhamel advocate the creation of a "European right to vote" for nomadic people, allowing them to vote in whichever country they are in at the moment of the European elections. Actually, this idea of an European right to vote is to be extended to all European citizens, as Alima Boumedienne-Thiery and Olivier Duhamel (2000) recommend :
"in a context of extreme mobility, it is fundamental that the individual be a citizen wherever he is, as more and more persons will spend a considerable amount of their time abroad"
If any voter has the right to vote in any country for European elections, it seems important to be equipped with electoral rules that are non manipulable by the movement of the voters. As a last illustrating example, let us recall that French citizens living abroad are allowed, when voting, to choose the constituency in which they cast their ballot for some of the French elections.
One solution to this problem of could be simply resolved by prohibiting electors from changing jurisdiction to cast their ballot. However, eventhough electors are not allowed to change jurisdiction, the designers of the election may try to artificialy make them move. This is known under the name of gerrymandering. Indeed, the design of boundaries is sometimes subject to serious contentious in the United States, suggesting that politicians aim at altering the results of the election by doing so. Gerrymandering is, from a logical point of view, equivalent to manipulation by movements of the electors. Instead of the voters themselves, the designers of the jurisdictions' boundaries are the manipulators.
Since Arrow's impossibility theorem (see Arrow (1963) ), the axiomatic approach of social choice theory has provided a floodgate of negative or positive results for the analysis of voting rules. Surprisingly enough, little attention has been devoted to the study of two step procedures, though a few contributions have already proposed normative conditions to judge the quality of a federal system (as two step procedures), the oldest being due to Penrose (1946) and Banzhaf (1968) : both suggested that in federal unions, every voter should be given the same power, that is the same probability to influence the outcome. More recently, Felsenthal and Machover (1999) as well as Barberà and Jackson (2004) have come with the following suggestion: a federal state should maximize on average the total utility of the citizens. Feix, Lepelley, Merlin and Rouet (2004) have suggested that the way to attribute mandates to a state should minimize the probability of electing a candidate who does not obtain the majority of the popular vote over the whole union. However, all these papers assume the same structure: there is a two party competition in every state and the party which obtains the majority of the votes gets all the mandates for this state. Then some kind of quota rule is used at the federal level . Furthermore, there is a long tradition of contributions on the rounding off problem, that is, the search of rules to allocate the mandates proportionally to the populations of the different members (see the classical book of Balinski and Young (1982) ). This tradition assumes from the start that the voting rule is the proportional rule.
It is important to notice that from a conceptual point of view, the framework considered here is different from that of Arrow's theorem. First, given the two step procedure and allowing for voters to change jurisdiction, it appears that the global electoral rule must be defined by the specific partition of the electors in addition to the vote profile. Contrary to the traditional arrovian framework, more than just the preferences are required here in order to define the federal constitution voting procedure. Hence, the fact that the rule depends on the partition of the electors makes it possible for one given vote profile to yield to different winners, according to the partition. For that reason, the combination of jurisdictional rules that are social choice functions, with a federal rule that is also a social choice function, cannot be summarized into one unique social choice function, hence departing from the arrovian framework 2 . Next, the imposition of a sovereignty condition, as will be done throughout, makes it impossible to define 1 The second level of aggregation will be called throughout the federal level, for convenience only. It is in fact an abuse of language as there are federal systems in which elections are direct (Brasil for instance) and systems that are not federal but in which elections are indirect (United Kingdom for instance).
2 In its original form, the Arrow theorem considers social welfare functions. The remark just made, pointing out the difference with our framework lies elsewhere than in this distinction between social welfare functions and social choice functions. It relies on the fact that we take into account more information than the preferences. a dictatorship in this framework, as will be shown further. This also implies that the framework considered differs from that of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem about manipulation.
In this paper, we study two step voting procedures in a general framework that does not restrict the particular voting method used at every step of the procedure. So far, the only requirement made on these jurisdictional voting rules is that of Jurisdiction Sovereignty, stating that the result of the election in every jurisdiction should only depend on the votes casted by the individuals within that jurisdiction. Thus the result should be independent of what happens in the neighbor jurisdictions. We then assume that individuals submit one vote for one candidate in their jurisdiction, the votes being aggregated by the jurisdictional voting rules. Next, the candidates winning at first step are collected and aggregated at the second step, with a federal voting rule.
The question examined in this paper is that of the existence of constitutions involving two step procedures whose results are independent from the location of voters and are, therefore, stable and non manipulable in the sense given to these words above. In the case of an arbitrary finite number of candidates, the answer to that question is positive, although the set of rules allowing for "movement-proofness" is very small. When imposing a jurisdictional paretian condition, according to which a jurisdiction should elect a given candidate when he receives the unanimity of votes in that jurisdiction, the rules we are left with are rather undemocratic
3
. The first set of rules satisfying stability is the Constant Constitution, stating that whoever the winners are at the first step (the jurisdiction level), the winner at the second step is always the same. The federal voting rule is thus constant with respect to the vote profile. The second set of rules satisfying stability all share an undesirable feature. Hence, as to satisfy stability, if the rule is not the Constant Constitution, it is necessary that every individual in the society is given the power of overruling the unanimity. Individuals are then said to be pivotal.
In the more specific case of two candidates, the same analysis leads to a complete characterization result, for which the set of rules satisfying stability as well as the jurisdictional paretian condition is defined. This set consists of the Constant Constitution and the so called Unanimity Rules, that requires unanimity for one candidate for him to be elected, while any other situation elects his rival. Next, the paretian condition is relaxed into a condition called Local Faithfulness, following Young (1974)'s terminology, stating that when a jurisdiction is formed by a single individual, the winner in that jurisdiction should be the one chosen by that individual. We then observe that the set of rules satisfying stability is still formed of the Constant Constitution and the Unanimity Rules, but a third class of rules appear. It is the rather strange class of Parity Rules, that has not yet, at the best of our knowledge, been studied. A Parity Rule designates in every jurisdiction as well as at the aggregate level, a candidate ac-cording to the parity of the votes the candidate receives. Thus, it appears thus that no constitution involving a two step electoral procedure can be democratic and stable at the same time. The positive answer that is provided to the question examined herein is thus to be taken as an impossibility result.
At this stage, it is useful to mention some previous works on representative democracies, due to Murakami (1966) , Fishburn (1971) and Fine (1972) concentrating on the specific case where the collective decisions rest on the majority rule between two alternatives. These studies completed May (1952)'s characterization of the majority rule by relaxing the anonymity assumption. Murakami's main result states that a representative system using the majority rule at each stage is characterized by neutrality, monotonicity, and non-dictatorship. The analysis presented herein departs from these works as it considers any finite number of candidates and it does not assume majority rule from the start. It also is restrained to the case of two steps procedures. In this regard, this contribution is closer to the recent ones of Lainé (1999, 2000) , Chambers (2006) and Perote-Peña (2005) , which also consider more than two alternatives and two steps procedures. Differences and similarities between these various contributions will be discussed at the end of section 5.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe the formal framework used for modelling two step voting procedures and we present several normative properties that may be imposed on them. In particular, we discuss the different stability properties that prevent the outcome of these voting procedures from being manipulable by a move of the electors. Section 3 provides the main theorem of the paper for the general case of any finite number of candidates. Section 4 provides a more complete characterization result in the case of two candidates and explores the consequences of relaxing the paretian condition into the milder Local Faithfulness condition. Section 5 gives some additional comments and concludes.
2 The general framework
Notations and Definitions
Let the finite and fixed set of candidates be defined as A = {a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a p }, the fixed set of voters is N = {1, . . . , i, . . . , n}, with n ≥ 3, and J = {J 1 , . . . , J j , . . . , J m } is the set of jurisdictions, with m ≥ 2. We also assume that n > m.
Let σ be a partition function from
In what follows, we will consider partition functions in Σ, defined as the set of all partitions such that ∀ j ∈ {1, . . . , m}, σ −1 (j) = ∅. Hence for any partition σ in Σ, there is no empty jurisdiction and as n > m, there is at least one jurisdiction with at least two individuals.
Individuals For an election, the j-th jurisdiction J j will provide a jurisdictional winner designated by the social choice function f j :
We impose the following very mild condition on the functions {f j } j=1,m :
In words, the result of an election in jurisdiction J j is independent from what happens in any other jurisdiction J j . This property is an independence condition that makes a federation consistent. Indeed, the indirect characteristic of the electoral system would vanish without it. The set of all social choice functions satisfying Jurisdiction Sovereignty is denoted by F.
The m jurisdictional winners yield a jurisdictional vote profile Π ∈ A m , called a federal profile. The federation then appoints a federal winner using the federal social choice function g defined as follows:
For a given constitution, the federal winner of the election will be denoted by: 3 . Assume furthermore that the jurisdictional rules as well as the federal voting rule are all given by the majority rule. In case of a tie in a jurisdiction (resp. at the federal level), a will arbitrarily be designated as the winner in that jurisdiction (resp. in the federation). Consider now the voting profile π = (a, a, a, b, b) where individuals 1 to 3 vote for a while individuals 4 and 5 vote for b. Partition σ is such that σ(1) = σ(2) = σ(3) = 1, σ(4) = 2 and σ(5) = 3. Thus the winner in J 1 is a, while the winner in J 2 and
In that case, the winner in J 1 and in J 2 is a, while the winner in
Properties
We define some properties we might impose on the different social choice functions. The first two axioms are imposed on the jurisdiction functions f j :
Faithfulness was first introduced by Young (1974) for his characterization of the Borda Choice Correspondence. It requires that when society consists of a single individual, it should choose its most preferred alternative. As in our setting we restrain this condition to jurisdictional rules only, we call it local.
Axiom 2 Local Pareto
When every individual in a jurisdiction votes for the same candidate, that one should be elected in his jurisdiction. Local Pareto implies Local Faithfulness.
We now turn to the conditions imposed on the federal constitution C as to convey the different ideas about manipulation by movement.
Axiom 3 Individual Stability
This property requires that no single voter can affect the outcome alone by changing jurisdiction (without changing his vote).
Axiom 4 Stability
Stability is a generalized version of Individual Stability. It states that no coalition of voters can change the result of a federal election by simply changing jurisdictions. Therefore, the result of the election should be independent from the partition of the individuals. Recall that the framework considered in order to define federal constitutions departs from the traditional arrovian framework, by the fact that the voting procedure depends on the partition of the individuals. Thus Stability is a condition such that this non arrovian framework coincides with the arrovian one.
As a logical negation, one can define the corresponding Individual Instability axiom, according to which there exists at least one vote profile such that one individual can change the outcome of the election on its own by changing jurisdiction. Similarly, we can define the corresponding Instability axiom by saying that a federal constitution C is unstable if and only if it is not stable, i.e. there is at least one vote profile such that a group of voters can change the result by changing their voting jurisdictions.
In line with the instability axioms, we define the two manipulability axioms:
With Individual Manipulability, not only can a single voter change the outcome of an election by changing jurisdiction, he can also do that in his favor. Said differently, g(f (σ, π)) is not a Nash Equilibrium in the game where strategies are given by the choice of a jurisdiction.
Axiom 6 Manipulability
When a constitution is manipulable, coalitions of voters can change the result of a federal election by changing jurisdictions and they can do it in the favor of all the members of the coalition. g(f (σ, π)) is not a Nash Equilibrium with respect to coalition movements.
The following theorem shows how the concepts of stability and manipulability relate one with the other. , π) ), or the reverse. So individual i can manipulate g by moving from σ to σ or from σ to σ . 2-A constitution C is individually stable if and only if it is stable: Assume C is individually stable, but fails to satisfy Stability. Thus, there exists π ∈ A n and σ, σ ∈ Σ such that g(f (σ, π)) = g(f (σ , π)). As n > m, there exists a sequence of partitions, σ = σ 0 , σ 1 , . . . , σ k , . . . , σ l = σ such that only one voter moves in between σ k and σ k+1 . At some point in the sequence, we get
Theorem 1 For any set of candidates A, a constitution C is unstable if and only if it is individually manipulable.

Proof of Theorem 1 : 1-A constitution C is individually unstable if and only if it is individually manipulable : if C is individually unstable, then ∃π ∈
It can seem undesirable that a coalition of voters who do not change their votes but who change jurisdictions could invert the result of an election. However, if one does not feel uncomfortable with that, he might feel uncomfortable with the fact that the result of an election depends only on the location of one single voter. Theorem 1 states that these two facts are identical.
Pivotal Individuals
In every constitution, it seems reasonable to ask for the decision not to be concentrated in the hand of one unique voter. We express part of this idea with the following definitions, stating that one individual alone cannot alter the outcome while all the other individuals vote unanimously for the same candidate.
Before proceeding, we define the Unanimous vote profile π z as the vote profile such that π| i = z for all i in N , for any alternative z in A. It follows that π a is the unanimous vote profile for candidate a, π b is the unanimous vote profile for candidate b etc...
Definition 2 Pivotal individual in π z
Voter i is called pivotal in π z with z ∈ A if ∃ y ∈ A, z = y and π such that π| i = y and
A pivotal individual is thus pivotal for at least one unanimous vote profile. Note that a pivotal individual i does not have the power to impose his best choice to society, he can only change the winner on his own by voting for y at some unanimous profile π z (but his best choice could be a third candidate). Furthermore, a pivotal individual is defined only with respect to cases for which all other individual are unanimous on candidate z. Hence a pivot in π z might not be able to change the outcome of the election if at least one other voter votes for another candidate than z. Being pivotal is thus not equivalent to having a veto power.
A Result on Stable Constitutions
In this section the main theorem of the paper is presented. It says that any constitution satisfying Stability and Local Pareto necessarily gives the power to every elector of being pivotal, unless it is the Constant Constitution, which definition is provided below.
Definition 4 Constant Constitution
A Constant Constitution is a voting rule such that, whatever the results of the jurisdiction elections, the federal winner is always the same. These rules are totally independent from the electors. A Constant Constitution is a large class of rules, as it is defined irrespective of the properties satisfied by the jurisdictional rules f j as well as of the properties of the federal rule g. Among others we define the following subclass:
Definition 5 LP Constant Constitution A federal constitution C is LP constant if it is a Constant Constitution for which every jurisdiction rule f j satisfies Local Pareto.
We now turn to some preliminary propositions which will be useful to state and prove the main theorem. Proof of Proposition 1 : Assume that individual i is pivotal in π a j by voting for candidate a k . Consider the vote profile π where every individual votes for a j except individual i who votes for a k , and the partition σ such that
. . , a j ). Consider then the vote profile π where every individual votes for a j except individual h who votes for a k , and the partition σ such that 
Proof of Proposition 2 :
The case m = 2 is trivial as necesarily s = 1.
Consider m > 2 and assume, without loss of generality, that the federal profile Π contains the s alternatives a 1 to a s . Because s < m, the federal profile Π has at least one alternative that is present more than once. Consider any federal profile Π such that Π | j = Π| j for all j = k and Π | k = Π| k , and such that Π contains also the same s different alternatives a 1 to a s . Hence only one coordinate has changed from Π to Π , and both profiles have exactly the same number of different alternatives. For instance, assume Π ex = a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a s−1 , a s , a s We first show that for two such profiles, g(Π) = g(Π ). In order to construct Π , it is necessary that the alternative that has been changed in Π is present more than once in Π. Assume, without loss of generality, that Π = Π ex and Π = Π ex , thus in J m , the alternative a s has been replaced by alternative a 1 . Consider the individuals vote profile π in which two individuals vote for a 1 , every alternative a 2 to a s−1 receives one vote and the n − s remaining individuals vote for a s . This vote profile, with two adequate partitions σ and σ , can generate both the profiles Π and Π . Indeed, consider σ such that the two individuals voting for a 1 are together in J 1 , the jurisdictions J 2 to J s−1 are singletons formed respectively of the individual voting for a 2 to that voting for a s−1 , and jurisdictions J s to J m are filled with the individuals voting for a s . Using Local Pareto, this partition generates the federal profile Π ex . Consider then the partition σ such that J 1 is a singleton formed of one of the a 1 voters, jurisdictions J 2 to J m−1 do not change, and J m is a singleton formed of the second a 1 voter. Using Local Pareto again, this partition generates the federal profile Π ex .
In both cases, the individuals vote profile is the same, as only the partition has changed. Therefore, using Stability, we have g (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a s−1 , a s , a s , . . . a s ) = g(a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a s−1 , a s , a s , . . . a 1 ) As a general result, any federal profiles Π and Π such that Π | j = Π| j for all j = k and Π | k = Π| k , and such that Π has the same number s of different alternatives, both elect the same winner.
In order to conclude, we use the fact that any federal profile Π , containing exactly s different alternatives, can be obtained starting from Π, another federal profile containing exactly the same s different alternatives, by a sequence of replacements of one alternative by another, each of these replacements leaving the new federal profile with exactly the s same different alternatives.
Before stating and proving the main theorem of this section, one more intermediate proposition is given. It says that when the constitution C satisfies Local Pareto and Stability, then the federal social choice function g is anonymous. Let us first define anonymity. 
Axiom 7 Federal Anonymity
Proof of Proposition 3 :
Given Local Pareto, it is possible to generate any federal profile Π by forming homogenous partitions, for which any individual in J j votes for Π| j .
Any permutation µ on the name of the jurisdictions generates a federal profile µ(Π) that can be obtained as the result of the corresponding permutation on the set of individuals, i.e. the partition σ such that σ(i) = j and
The theorem can now be stated. 
Proof of Theorem 2:
The sketch goes as follows. We assume that in C, no individual is pivotal, although C satisfies Local Pareto and Stability. This will imply that C can only be a LP Constant Constitution. This implication, said differently, also states that if a federal constitution C satisfies Stability, Local Pareto and is not a LP Constant Constitution, then in C there is at least one pivotal individual. By proposition 1, the theorem will then be proved.
The proof is led by induction over natural numbers. First we show that all the possible federal profiles containing only one or two alternatives give the same winner, which we call z. Next we assume that any federal profile containing s or less different alternatives, s < m, also gives z as the winner and we show that this implies that any federal profile containing s+1 different alternatives gives z as the winner of the election. A last argument will then be given to show that it is unnecessary to go beyond s ≥ m.
Assume thus that C satisfies Local Pareto, Stability, and no individual is pivotal. Consider any alternative a j . The vote profile π a j is such that every individual votes for candidate a j , leading by Local Pareto to g(f (σ, π a j )) = g(a j , . . . , a j ). Call this winner z and consider the vote profile such that every elector votes for a j , except one who votes for any other alternative a k . Consider the partition σ such that the a k voter is alone in the last jurisdiction J m . By Local Pareto, this vote profile leads to g(a j , . . . , a j , a k ) and as it is assumed that no individual is pivotal, this implies that g(a j , . . . , a j , a k ) = g(a j , . . . , a j 
Given proposition 2, this implies that any federal profile containing alternatives a j and a k yields z as the winner. Thus,   g(a j , . . . , a j ) = . . . g(a j , . . . , a j , a k , . . . , a k ) = . . . = g(a j , a k , . . . , a k ) Furthermore, this last term of the above equality can be generated by the voting profile in which every individual votes for a k except individual 1 who votes for a j , if individual 1 is put alone in jurisdiction J 1 . But again, no individual is pivotal, so that when individual 1 changes his vote to a k , the result of the election is still z. Hence,  g(a k , . . . , a k 
We have shown that for any candidate a j , if the winner associated to the unanimous vote profile π a j is z, then any unanimous vote profile π a k should elect z, as well as any federal profile containing exactly two different alternatives.
Assume now that the result of the election is z whenever there are s or less different alternatives in the federal profile, with s < m. Consider the vote profile such that one individual votes for a 1 1 , a 2 , . . . , a s−2 , a s−1 , . . . , a s−1 , f m ) = z whatever the value of f m Consider now the same partition of the individuals, and assume the last two individuals vote respectively for a s and a s+1 . We have no information about the outcome of the last jurisdiction, as Local Pareto does not apply. However, this vote profile will generate a federal profile of the form g (a 1 , a 2 Notice that the vote profile has not changed, only the partition has changed. Therefore, according to Stability, the winner is still z. Thus there is a federal profile containing s + 1 alternatives, and this profile gives z as the winner. There are two possibilities here: s+1 < m or s+1 = m. In the first case, proposition 2 helps us conclude, as we will then have z as the winner whenever there are s+1 different alternatives at the federal level. In the second case, there are as much alternatives as jurisdictions, so that every jurisdiction elects a different candidate. Proposition 3 states that g is anonymous, implying that all the possible federal profiles give the same winner.
What remains to prove is the case where s ≥ m. Notice, however, that any vote profile containing p alternatives, with p > m, will generate a federal profile containing no more than m alternatives. Proposition 3 thus helps us concluding.
As a consequence, we have shown that for any set of candidates A = {a 1 , . . . , a p }, if C satisfies Local Pareto, Stability, and has no pivotal individual, then all the possible federal profiles give the same winner. Therefore, the federal constitution is a LP Constant Constitution.
Although this result is not complete, as there is no exact characterization given of stable voting rules, theorem 2 is sufficient in order to give a negative answer to the question raised in this paper, that of the existence of non-manipulable constitutions. No matter what exact set of rules is defined, they all share a crucial weakness, that of letting every individual be pivotal.
As mentioned, the theorem does not give an entire characterization of the set of rules that do allow for Stability along with Local Pareto. This characterization is, we believe, unnecessary to stress out that manipulation is a possible byproduct of two stage elections, as pivotal individuals are undesirable enough. However, it seems interesting to provide some examples of rules other than the Constant Constitution which are stable. For that purpose, the specific case of two candidates is examined in the following.
The case of two candidates
In this section we restrain our analysis to the case of two candidates, A = {a, b}.
In what remains we use the following notation : π 0 = π a is the unanimous profile for a, π 
Local Pareto
In this section we give a characterization of the set of rules which satisfy both Stability and Local Pareto. To do this, we first define what we call the class of Unanimity Rules.
As to be more formal, we use the following notation: when z ∈ A is either one of the two candidates, we denote byz his opponent. For instance, if z = b, thenz denotes a.
Definition 6 Unanimity Rule
In words, a unanimity rule is such that at both the jurisdictional and the federal levels, unanimity is required for one candidate to be elected while his opponent wins in all other cases. As A = {a, b}, Unanimity Rule is a class of four rules only: Unanimity Rule (a, a); Unanimity Rule (a, b); Unanimity Rule (b, a) and Unanimity Rule (b, b). For instance, Unanimity Rule (a, a) is such that in every jurisdiction, if a receives unanimity then a is elected at the jurisdiction level, otherwise b is. At the federal level, if a is unanimous then a is the winner, otherwise b is. Therefore, when every individual votes for a, the federal winner is a. In any other case, the federal winner is b. In turn, Unanimity Rule (b, a) is such that a is elected as the final winner if and only if everyone votes for b. In any other case, b is elected.
We now turn to the characterization theorem.
. . , f m ) satisfies Local Pareto and Stability if and only if C is a LP Constant Constitution or is a Unanimity
Rules.
Proof of Theorem 3 :
• Implication ⇐= By definition, the LP Constant Constitution is stable and satisfies Local Pareto. Unanimity Rule is a class of rules that satisfy Local Pareto. Moreover they satisfy Stability. Indeed, if unanimity is required for x and voter i is a x voter, then when he changes jurisdiction, it does neither affect the jurisdiction he left nor the jurisdiction he is arriving in. If voter i is ax voter, then the jurisdiction he left may become unanimous about x, but the one he arrives in will not be. In any case the winner of the election will remain the same.
• Implication =⇒ Assume C satisfies Local Pareto and Stability. Then, according to theorem 2, we know that C is either the LP Constant Constitution or in C, every individual is pivotal. Notice that any vote profile containing both options a and b can yield, using Local Pareto and building homogenous partitions, to federal profiles containing both options. We can thus use Proposition 2 to state that
Hence not only every federal profile containing both options give the same winner, it is also true for every vote profile. The only remaining vote profiles for which nothing can be said are π 0 and π
Recalling that whenever z is either of the two candidates,z denotes his opponent, there are four possible cases:
Note that along any two sequences of individual changes l 1 , ..., l n and l 1 , ..., l n , it is not possible that we are in two different cases. This is the consequence of proposition 1 according to which the existence of one pivotal individual implies that every individual is pivotal.
We show here that case (4) cannot hold. Assume there exists a sequence
Now let all the other individuals switch their votes. We will achieve g(f (σ, π
Hence there is no sequence such as case (4).
We have shown that for any sequence l 1 , . . . , l n we necessarily have case (1), (2) or (3). In case (1) the outcome remains constant throughout the sequence while in cases (2) and (3) all individuals are pivotal. Case (1) is a Constant Constitution and Local Pareto is satisfied so it is a LP Constant Constitution. It remains proving that cases (2) and (3) generate the four possible Unanimity Rules.
Consider that every sequence is in case (3) . Given Local Pareto, we know that in π 0 we get g(f (σ, π 0 )) = g(a, . . . , a) =z ∀σ. Consider σ such that the m − 1 first jurisdictions are singletons and the last one is filled with all the remaining voters. Then, in π b, a, . . . , a) = z. According to proposition 3, g is anonymous, so that whenever the federal profile has one jurisdiction in which b is elected, while all the others elect a, then the federal winner is z.
We also get g(f (σ, π b, a, . . . , a) = z. Again, Federal Anonymity says that whenever the federal profile is formed of two b's and m − 2 a's, the winner is z .  Going on until π m−1 we reach g(b, . . . , b, a) In the same way, case (2) will lead to Unanimity Rule (b, a) and Unanimity Rule (b, b). 
Remark 2 Although it was not a specific requirement, the rules characterized in
Local Faithfulness
In this subsection, the consequences of weakening the Local Pareto condition into the Local Faithfulness one are explored. Trivially, Local Faithfulness is satisfied whenever Local Pareto is assumed, but the reverse is not true. Indeed, Local Faithfulness says that in the case a jurisdiction is a singleton, the choice of the jurisdiction should be the choice of the individual composing it. Yet Local Faithfulness keeps silent on what happens in jurisdictions with at least two individuals.
We now define two other classes of rules in order to state the theorem.
Definition 7 LF Constant Constitution A federal constitution C is LF constant if it is a Constant Constitution for which every jurisdiction rule f j satisfies Local Faithfulness.
Next we define what we call the class of Parity Rules. In words, a parity rule is such that at both the jurisdictional and the federal levels, the winner is designated uniquely by the parity of the votes he or his opponent receives.
Definition 8 The Parity Rule
Let (x, y, z) ∈ A
. A federal constitution is a Parity Rule (x, y, z) if: -in every jurisdiction, if the number of voters for candidate x is odd, then x is the jurisdiction winner. If that number is even thenx wins. -at the federal level, if the number of jurisdictions that have chosen y is odd, then z is the winner. If that number is even, thenz is the winner.
This class of rules may look rather peculiar and has, to the best of our knowledge, never been studied. It bases the election on the parity of the votes. As A = {a, b}, Parity Rule is a class of eight rules: Parity Rule (a,a,a) For instance, Parity Rule (a,b,a) is the following: in every jurisdiction, if the number of votes for a is odd then a is the winner in the jurisdiction, otherwise b is. At the federal level, if the number of jurisdictions that voted for b is odd, then a is the winner, otherwise b is. As a matter of illustration of this rule, assume N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, m = 3 and the partition of society is given by σ such that J 1 = {1}, J 2 = {2}, J 3 = {3, 4}. For the unanimous vote profile π a , we obtain
One interesting feature of this class of rules is, as we will see further in more details, that every time an elector changes his vote, he changes the outcome of the election. Thus if another individual changes his vote at the same time they both neutralise themselves.
A few preliminary lemmas and propositions are needed, all of them being based on the following assumption: 
Assume furthermore that there exists an individual
We are thus assuming that the constitution always gives the same winner, until k + 1 individuals have changed their vote. We then have the following:
When he changes his vote from a to b, voter l k+1 changes the result of any jurisdiction he belongs to. Proof of Lemma 1: Assume on the contrary that there exists a σ such that f j (σ, π In σ, voters l k and l k+1 are together in the same jurisdiction. We can thus state, using Local Faithfulness and the three lemmas :
As a consequence,
Consider now the partition σ such that In σ , voters l k and l k+1 are separated in different jurisdictions. We can thus state, using Local Faithfulness and the three lemmas :
which contradicts with the conclusion obtained for σ. However, for k ≥ m the partition σ cannot be constructed as there are only m jurisdictions in the federation. We need thus proceed differently.
Second step: Let us assume that k, m ≤ k ≤ n − 2 and assumption A k holds. The proof follows the same lines as that of the first step using different partitions. g(b, a, . . . , a, f m ) , and this, as we just have seen, is equal toz. Therefore individual l i is also pivotal in π a . And this is true ∀l i .
We can now state and prove the theorem 4. 
Proof of Theorem 4:
• Implication ⇐= By definition, the LF Constant Constitution class is stable and satisfies Local Faithfulness. Unanimity Rule is a class of rules that all satisfy Local Faithfulness (as they satisfy Local Pareto). Moreover they also satisfy Stability.
Parity Rule is a class of rules that satisfies Local Faithfulness. Indeed, when a voter is alone, his parity is odd so his candidate wins in his jurisdiction. The class also satisfies Stability. To see this, simply notice that when a voter changes jurisdiction, his movement has two effects: it changes the parity of the jurisdiction he was in and it changes the parity of the jurisdiction he arrives in. Thus two jurisdictions change votes and therefore the parity at the federal level does not change. The rule is thus stable.
• Implication =⇒ Assume C, a federal constitution, satisfies Local Faithfulness and Stability. Proposition 4 can then be applied, and hence assumption A k cannot hold for any k,
Let us analyse what the negation of Assumption A k implies.
• Either g(f (σ, π 0 )) = z and ∃ l 1 such that g(f (σ, π
)) = z for any sequence l 1 , . . . l n−1 . There are then two subcases. Either g(f (σ, π n )) =z and then necessarily individual l n is pivotal in π b . Or g(f (σ, π n )) = z and then C is a Constant Constitution satisfying Local Faithfulness.
Thus either C is an LF Constant Constitution or in C, there is at least one pivotal individual, which in turn implies, according to proposition 5, that every individual is pivotal.
Notice that the reasoning we just held can also be made when starting from the profile π n where all individuals vote for b, and going towards π 0 . We thus have the following: if for any sequence l 1 
We next proceed to the determination of the set of all the rules such that every individual is pivotal. Before doing so, however, it is usefull to give the lines of what follows. We know that if no individual is pivotal, we are left with the Constant Constitution. Indeed, the difficult case arises when all individuals are pivotal. We are thus confronted with two possible cases when considering all possible vote profiles from π 0 to π n : either the result of the election changes only once in that sequence, or it changes more than once. In the first case we will be left with the Unanimity Rules, while in the second, only the Parity Rules will remain. All cases are considered below, however, before analysing what possible rules are generated, we point out the following property: -Case 2ab: assume g(f (σ, π n )) = z. Then the outcome is z for profiles π 0 and π n and it isz for any other profile. We show here that this case cannot occur as it leads to a contradiction. Consider the partition σ such that )) =z so necessarily, g(f (σ, π g(a, . . . , a,f where every individual that is alone in his jurisdiction has changed his vote and where only one individual in jurisdiction J m has changed his. For that profile, the outcome of the election is by hypothesisz. We then have, using Local Faithfulness, g(f (σ, π
)) =z and this is a contradiction. Hence there is no such case as 2ab.
• Case 2b: For every individual l h we have g(f (σ, π
We thus have four cases: case 1a generates the LF Constant Constitutions. We next show that cases 1b and 2aa generate all the Unanimity Rules while case 2b generates all Parity Rules.
Cases 1b and 2aa generate all Unanimity Rules
The two cases are symmetric. We will thus show that case 2aa generates Unanimity Rules (a, a) and (a, b). The same reasoning can then be led to show that case 1b generates Unanimity Rules (b, a) and (b, b). Let the partition σ be such that the m − 1 first jurisdictions are singletons and the last one is filled with all the remaining voters. Then in π 0 , using Local Faithfulness, we get g(f (σ, π 0 )) = g(a, . . . , a, f m ) = z. We must show that necessarily f m = a. Then it will follow that the only configuration such that z wins the election is given by the federal profile Π = a, . . . , a that can only be obtained by the vote profile π 0 . All the other vote profiles makez the winner and therefore, according to the value of z, we will get either Unanimity Rule (a, a) or Unanimity Rule (a, b). g(a, . . . , a,f m ) = g(a, . . . , a, a) . Let all the voters that are alone change one after the other their vote. This leads us to g (b, a, . . . , a, a) = g(b, b, a, . . . , a, a) = . . . = g(b, . . . , b, a) =z. Hence, any combination such that jurisdiction J m votes for a givesz as the winner. Consider now another partition σ such that jurisdiction J m is a singleton. Then in π 0 , necessarily jurisdiction J m chooses a. But we have just seen that all the combinations such that J m chooses a givez as the winner, so this implies g(f (σ , π 0 )) =z. This is thus a contradiction with Stability; the cause of this contradiction is the assumption that f m = b. Hence f m = a.
Case 2b generates all Parity Rules Assume without loss of generality that n, the number of electors is odd and we have g (f (σ, π 0 ) 
Consider the partition σ such that the m − 1 first jurisdictions are singletons and the m-th jurisdiction is filled with the n − m + 1 remaining voters. Using Local Faithfulness we get g(f (σ, π 0 )) = g(a, . . . , a, f m ) = z. In π 1 , we can change any individual's vote as to reach
Necessarily, if two individuals in jurisdiction m change their vote, then by Stability, the result in J m will be f m , so
Hence in π 3 the outcome isz, like we had in π 1 . Changing the vote of every individual in turn we get
and all these givez as the winner, by Stability.
Next we reach π 4 for which the outcome is again changed to z etc...
As to completely characterize the rule we have just described, it remains determining the value of f m . Assume f m = a. We notice that when the number of b's present at the aggregate level is even, the outcome is z, whereas an odd number of b's yields z as the winner
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. Therefore the rule at the aggregate level is the Parity Rule. In the same way, we notice that in jurisdiction J m the outcome depends on the parity of b's (resp. of a's) in the vote profile of that jurisdiction. Therefore the voting rule in J m is the Parity Rule. Finally, it is possible to lead the same reasoning when inverting the jurisdictions so that the rule in every jurisdiction is the Parity Rule. The same can be said if f m = b and all the cases we face generate the eight Parity Rules.
Theorem 4 says roughly the same as theorem 3. Its contribution, apart from yielding a strange set of rules, is to show that the non-democratic feature of theorem 1 is due to the stability condition rather than to the Local Pareto one, as relaxing it into Local Faithfulness does not help achieving more acceptable rules.
Remark 3 As for theorem 3 we notice that, if C is not in the class of the Constant
Constitutions, all the rules characterized imply that all the jurisdiction rules are identical, f j = f j .
Comments and Conclusion
Dictatorship
As a surprising feature, one can notice that dictatorship is not in the set of stable rules for constitutions satisfying either Local Pareto or the weaker Local Faithfulness condition. This is all the most surprising as dictatorship is usually the rule one obtains in the more classical impossibility results, such as Arrow's and Gibbard and Satterthwaite's theorems.
The reason is the following: in a federal constitution, the description of the voting procedure has to include a definition of the jurisdictional rules as well as the federal voting rule. Hence, if individual i is a dictator, it can be detected in the jurisdiction in which i votes. However, at the federal level, there is no information remaining about the identity of the voters, as the rule is based on the results in all jurisdictions.
The most natural way to define dictatorship would be to state that the jurisdiction in which i votes will elect according to i's choice, while all the other jurisdictions elect the same candidate as the one elected in i's jurisdiction. However, this implies that the result of the other jurisdictions changes whenever individual i changes his choice, a violation of Jurisdiction Sovereignty.
There is, however, a second way to define dictatorship in a federal constitution satisfying Jurisdiction Sovereignty, which is rather complicated. It is the following: all jurisdictions elect the same candidate a j , thus independently from individuals' choices, except that one containing individual i, which elects the candidate chosen by individual i. At the federal level, if all jurisdictions have elected candidate a j , then a j is the winner. If one jurisdiction has voted for candidate a k , a k = a j , then the winner is a k . This definition gives to individual i the power of a dictator.
However, this definition violates Local Faithfulness (and thus Local Pareto). It then appears that dictatorship is excluded from our framework, either by the imposition of Jurisdiction Sovereignty, or by that of Local Faithfulness.
A comprehensive comparison of recent results
For a long time, the works of Murakami (1966) Fishburn (1971) and Fine (1972) were the only contributions on the axiomatic analysis of two step voting rules. Clearly, the 2000 US presidential elections, as well as the debates about the European constitutions that sprung out after the Nice treaty have revived the analysis of two step voting rules in social choice theory. In this section we put our results into perspective by mentioning recent contributions on the same issue. Lainé (1999, 2000) started to analyze this issue in a series of published or unpublished papers since 1999, by focusing on its relationship with the Ostrogorski's Paradox (see Nurmi (1999) ) and the use of tournament solutions. Their model assumes that voters have strict preference over a set X of alternatives, of cardinality greater than 3. The number of voters in the society is odd, as well as the number of jurisdictions. Moreover, each jurisdiction has the same odd number of voters. Tournament solutions can then be used in a two step procedure: the preferences of the voters in a jurisdiction can be aggregated into a tournament via the majority rule, and the m tournaments obtained in this way are aggregated into a federal tournament, which solution will select a federal winner. The question is then to know whether a tournament solution exists such that its implementation to the preference profile of n voters coincides with the two step procedure described above. Lainé and Laffond clearly show that direct and representative democracy may lead to mutually inconsistent decisions when the society uses the majority rule and tournament solutions. The strength of their results comes from their ability to get an impossibility result with equal size constituencies, while we need single voter jurisdictions to build our proofs. Chambers (2003) reaches some impossibility results similar to ours although the framework considered therein is quite different 6 . Two main assumptions, departing from our study, are made in that contribution. First, the jurisdictional voting rules are all identical, i.e. f j = f ∀j, and the federal voting rule is also the same, i.e. g = f . This assumption therefore restricts the set of rules one can look for. As another consequence of this assumption, it becomes impossible to impose different conditions on the rules f j and g. For instance, whereas Local Pareto only applies to the jurisdictional rules in our case, the same Pareto condition (which Chambers names Unanimity) applies on both levels. Similarly, Anonymity is imposed on f from the start. Second, Chambers assumes that the rule f should be defined for any finite number of voters. Thus the voting rule used is defined for a variable population size, hence for any number of jurisdictions. The results might not hold in the case of a fixed number n of individuals or for a fixed number m of jurisdictions. In this framework, the non manipulability condition imposed is "Representative Consistency", stating that the indirect voting procedure should yield the same result as the direct voting rule, i.e. f (f (π), . . . , f (π)) = f (π). As the number of jurisdictions is not fixed, the outcome should not change whether the population is split in 2, 10 or any finite number of jurisdictions. Chambers reaches characterization results for any finite number of alternatives, with a general theorem stating that Anonymity, Representative Consistency and Unanimity together define the class of Priority Rules, which coincides with the union of our Unanimity Rules and Constant Constitutions in the case A = {a, b}.
The work by Perote-Peña uses a similar framework: the f j 's are identical to g, the number of jurisdiction may vary (though the total number of voters is fixed), the anonymity condition is needed together with a gerrymander-proof assumption (here called independence of institution formation, IIF) and the Pareto-Unanimity condition. The main contribution is that Perote-Peña assumes that the voters can express their whole preferences (represented by a weak ordering or a linear ordering) during the voting process. He proves that IFF, Pareto and Neutrality are incompatible with Anonymity. However, when droping Anonymity, he shows the existence of some rules, the characterization of which still awaits.
Concluding remarks
This paper was devoted to the study of manipulation by the movement of voters in federal constitutions. It appears that the only voting procedure that is non manipulable when imposing a local paretian condition and when requiring in addition that individuals should not have the power of overruling unanimous profiles, is the class of Constant Constitutions. This class of rules is such that the winner of the election is totally independent from the votes of the electors. This result is thus to be taken as an impossibility one.
When restricting the analysis to the case of two candidates, and when assuming that the result of the election should depend on the individuals' votes, the set of Unanimity Rules is characterized by the stability property when the local paretian condition is imposed. When relaxing this mild condition into a milder condition of Local Faithfulness, according to which any jurisdiction formed of a singleton should elect the candidate chosen by the lonely voter, another class of rules appears, that of Parity Rules. These rules designate the winner of the election according to the parity of the number of votes this candidate or his opponent receives.
All these negative results, together with ours, show that the existence of gerrymandering by the election designers or of manipulating by the electors, in two step electoral systems, is a robust fact. Whatever the framework, all conclusions go in the same direction. As a consequence, it seems that the noble principle defended by the two European deputies, according to which every European citizen should have the right to vote in any country he is at the time of the European election, would generate undesirable manipulations. Unless the voting procedure is direct.
